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Monetary Variability and 
Monetary Variables in the Franc Zone 
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ABSTRACT 
Failure to detect or account for structural changes in economic modelling can 
lead to misleading policy inferences, which can be perilous, especially for the 
more fragile economies of developing countries. Using three potential monetary 
policy instruments (Money Base, MO, and Reserve Money) for 13 member-states 
of the CFA Franc zone over the period 1989:11-2002:09, we investigate the 
magnitude of information extracted by employing data-driven techniques when 
analyzing breaks in time-series, rather than the simplifying practice of imposing 
policy implementation dates as break dates. The paper also tests Granger's 
(1980) aggregation theory and highlights some policy implications of the results. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE IMPORTANCE OF MONETARY VARIABLES in macroeconomic modelling is read-ily evident in almost all applied macroeconomic literature. Capturing the idiosyncratic behaviour of their time-series dynamics is essential, par-
ticularly when one considers the impact of monetary variability on inflation 
uncertainty and decreasing levels of economic activity.2 Although the sources 
of monetary variability can be quite diverse — ranging from differing national 
monetary policies or money demand disturbances to speculative short-term 
international capital transactions — the association between high monetary 
variability, inflation uncertainty and decreasing levels of economic activity 
should be an important policy issue.3 
On the one hand, substantial empirical evidence suggests a welfare-
reducing property of monetary variability (see for example the rational expec-
tations macro-models of Barro, 1976; Gray, 1976). On the other hand, 
Devereux (1987) finds evidence to the contrary. This apparent contradiction of 
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views notwithstanding, the accepted view is that high monetary variabilityis 
associated with substantial policy implications.4 It is plausible to infer that the 
overall effect, whetherpositive or negative, islikely tobe morepronounced in 
small and developing economies, not least, because of less developed financial 
markets and the central role of holding physical cash. Fielding (2004, p.2), in 
an article on the Franc zone of sub-Saharan Africa, states that 'Manipulating 
MO is still a potentially effective monetary policy strategy in countries where 
where financial marketsareunderdeveloped and cash makes up a large frac-
tion of the money stock'.5 However, as MO is the poor person's financial asset, 
it is most likely that the poor will bear the brunt of any inflationary spikes. 
Consequently, the issue of monetary variability, although important to any 
economy, is paramount to welfare and policy formulation in developing and 
transitional economies. 
The recent empirical literature has addressed the issue of monetary 
variability by considering breaks in corresponding series. In almost all cases, 
the breaks are identified using exogenous information such as the announce-
ment or the implementation date of a particular monetary policy. Such 
methodologies are relatively simple to implement, but imply not only that the 
impact of monetary policy on monetary variability is instantaneous and easi-
ly identified, but also that a significant change in monetary policy generates 
at most a single break in monetary variability. A more realistic methodology 
would consider possible transitional periods between an announcement date, 
implementation date(s) and the actual date(s) that monetary variability 
changes are observed. In addition, it would test for the existence of any other 
breaks that might exist in the series. However, the inherent complexity of 
implementing such methods would be unnecessary if their results turned out 
to be similar to the results of the simpler and less rigorous methodologies. 
Along these lines, the first purpose of this paper is to introduce a 
framework for conducting time-series analysis of monetary variability which 
makes use of recent advances in the non-parametric methods of detecting 
breaks in the mean and volatility dynamics. More data becoming readily avail-
able guarantees that such methods will continue becoming more popular in 
empirical work. In addition, because the underlying methods are data-driven, 
their results depend primarily on the properties of the available data and not 
on a collection of exogenous information.6 
The second purpose of the paper is to investigate, empirically, whether 
results obtained from a methodology drawn from this framework are different 
from results obtained from the standard methodology of imposing the break-
date using exogenous information. Using data from the Communaute 
Financiere Africaine (hereafter CFA) Franc Zone of sub-Saharan Africa, we find 
that in many cases not only do the results differ, but the evolution of monetary 
variability is substantially richer than thought a priori. In fact, we show that the 
use of the standard methodology appears to average out the effects of monetary 
variability. Consequently, moving beyond the standard paradigm is not only an 
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academic exercise, but is a crucial challenge for policy formulation. 
Finally, the third purpose of the paper is to examine the extent to which the 
use of different monetary variables can affect inferences based on the evolu-
tion of monetary variability. Using three monetary variables, the Money Base 
(aggregate variable), MO and Reserve Money (as the 
disaggregated variables), we and thatinmostcasesinference about monetary 
variability can be substantially affected by the choice of instrument used to 
measure it.7 Interestingly, when viewed in terms of Granger's (1980) aggrega-
tion hypothesis, the results suggest that the disaggregated data contain much 
more information than the aggregated data. This finding, in the context of 
monetary variability, is as interesting as it is unsettling for those who con-
struct the macro-models which inform policy makers' decisions given the 
weight it places on the appropriate choice of target instrument. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of monetary variability and relates this to the relevance of a curren-
cy devaluation incident as considered for the Franc zone. Section 3 describes 
the proposed procedure for modelling monetary variability. Section 4 describes 
the data employed and discusses theempirical results. Section5 lays out some 
possible policy implications of the findings and Section 6 concludes. 
2. M O N E T A R Y VARIABILITY A N D C U R R E N C Y D E V A L U A T I O N IN T H E F R A N C Z O N E 
One of the most acknowledged monetary policy issues, which is also directly 
relevant to monetary variability, is the issue of currency devaluation. As a pol-
icy issue, it relays key signals about the economy to internal and external 
observers. Consequently, the corresponding behaviour of monetary variables, 
that are likely to be targeted by monetary authorities in the event of currency 
devaluation, should attract a lot of attention from both policy makers and the 
research community. Indeed, since the 1970's research in this area has grown 
steadily, but is still relatively limited.8 For our purposes, this offers a solid 
platform on which we can base our analysis. The traditional paradigm sug-
gests that the currency devaluation (implementation) date introduces, at most, 
a single (and known) break. We focus on the CFA Franc zone African 
economies and for very good reasons. First, these countries are all classified 
as developing economies. Second, they share a common currency, and the 
January 1994 currency devaluation date is well known and uncontested. This 
uniformity will prove invaluable for drawing general conclusions.9 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The statistical procedure used in this paper shows a method for capturing the 
dynamics of monetary variability. It centers around a 'Nominating-Awarding' 
procedure (see Karoglou, 2006a), which can be used to provide robust esti-
mates of volatility around policy implementation dates. On the one hand, the 
traditional paradigm suggests quite simply that the only breakdate is the offi-
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cial policy implementation/announcement date. On the other hand, the 
Nominating-Awarding procedure suggests the use of a method of detecting all 
the potential breakdates in the series, and then a further method for deter-
mining which of these dates are, indeed, breakdates. In both stages, once 
breakdates have been identified the sample can be split accordingly into con-
tiguous segments. Then an estimator of the standard deviation can provide a 
measure of the variability in each segment.10 
In this paper, apart from the sample standard deviation, we also use 
the square-root of a Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
estimator of the variance. Consequently, we have not only a second more 
robust estimate of monetary variability, but also a rather straightforward 
method of assessing the impact of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation on 
the simple measures of monetary variability. Specifically, we use the VARHAC 
estimator of den Haan and Levin (1997), which bypasses the issue of selecting 
for estimation an appropriate bandwidth.11 
The above methodology is applied to three principal monetary variab-
less: the Money Base and its components — MO and Reserve Money. In this 
way we have also a direct way of testing Granger's (1980) aggregation hypoth-
esis; in other words we determine whether the disaggregated data contain 
more information than the aggregate data. If the number and/or timing of the 
breaks identified in MO and Reserve Money do not correspond to the breaks in 
the Money Base then the disaggregated data contains more information about 
monetary variability than the aggregated data and, therefore, should be pre-
ferred for macro-modelling. This is particularly important for policy making, 
when decisions are based on inferences that are sensitive to the underlying 
econometric model. It is instructive at this stage to outline the Nominating-
Awarding procedure. 
The Nominating breakdates stage 
The Nominating breakdates stage detects all the dates that could potentially 
be breakdates.12 A possible method is to use exogenous information, which is 
exactly what the traditional paradigm on monetary variability suggests 
(1994:01, in our case). To avoid imposing such a restriction on the informa-
tion the data can provide, using a data-driven method is suggested. This paper 
makes use of several statistical procedures, based on a number of recently 
developed non-parametric tests that detect a single break in volatility dynam-
ics. Specifically, we use: (i) the test of Inclan and Tiao, 1994 (I&T ); (ii) the two 
tests of Sanso, Arago, and Carrion, 2003 (SAC1 and, depending on whether 
we use the Bartlett or V ARHAC kernel variant, SAC*T and SAC™ ); (jji) the 
modified version of the test of Kokoska and Leipus, 2000 (K&L) as proposed 
by Andreou and Ghysels, 2002 (again, depending on whether we use the 
Bartlett or VARHAC kernel variant, K&LBT and ^ & A w ) ; and (iv) the test of 
Lee, Tokutsu and Maekawa, 2003 (LTM). 
- 20-
Economic Issues, Vol. 15, Part 2, 2010 
A key property of these tests is that they do not distinguish between 
breaks in the mean and volatility dynamics (Karoglou,2006b). For our pur-
poses, this is a plausible characteristic, since both types of break have to be 
taken into account. Some other properties of these tests worth mentioning 
include the following: I&T has been found to be most sensitive to the existence 
of volatility breaks for independent and identically distributed (iid) data, but 
suffers severe size distortions for strongly dependent data. In contrast, the 
variants of the K&L and SAC2 tests do not exhibit size distortions for strongly 
dependent data, but are known to exhibit lower power. The performance of 
both the SAC2 and LTM tests lie somewhere in between. In general, the rela-
tive performance of each of the above tests depends on the underlying data-
generating process (DGP).13 Therefore, when the DGP is not known, it is 
instructive to use all of these tests and, depending on the specific objective of 
the exercise, select the breakdate based on an appropriate rule. The rule used 
here is to select all the breakdates that any of these tests have identified, as 
the Nominated breakdates prior to any further validity tests in the Awarding 
breakdates stage. 
The above tests were designed primarily for detecting a single break-
date in a series. Therefore, in order to identify multiple breaks in a series, we 
need to incorporate them in an iterative scheme (algorithm). In this paper,we 
employ the algorithm proposed by Karoglou (2006b) comprising the following 
six steps: 
1. Calculate the test statistic under consideration using the available data. 
2. If the statistic is above the critical value, split the particular sample into 
two parts at the corresponding point. 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the first segment until no more (earlier) change-
points are found. 
4. Mark this point as an estimated change-point of the whole series. 
5. Remove the observations that precede this point (i.e. those that constitute 
the first segment). 
6. Consider the remaining observations as the new sample and repeat steps 
1 to 5 until no more change-points are found.14 
This algorithm is implemented with each of the seven test statistics mentioned 
above (i.e. I&T, SAC2, SAC2 , SAC2 , K&LBT, K8LLyH, LTM), and is applied 
to each series in (both) ascending and descending time order so as to avoid 
potentially existing masking effects. The nominated breakdates for each series 
are simply all those which have been detected in both directional cases. 
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The Awarding breakdates stage 
Following the nomination of the potential breakdates outlined in the preced-
ing section, this stage serves as a screening process and robustness check. 
The method is used to decide whether a nominated breakdate is indeed a 
breakdate. Initially, we simply assume that all nominations are breakdates. In 
fact, one can infer that this is what the traditional paradigm on monetary-
variability implicitly suggests. A more elaborate, but more robust method is to 
compare, statistically, the distributions of each pair of contiguous segments. 
In this paper, we focus on the mean and/or the varianceof contiguous seg-
ments. If both are statistically equal then we can assume that the two seg-
ments come from the same distribution,15 in which case, we unite the two seg-
ments into one. If either the mean or the variance of each segment is statisti-
cally different from the mean or the variance of its contiguous segment then 
we award the breakdate property to the hitherto nominated breakdate. 
Consequently, application of this method results in a subset of the nominated 
breakdates, which will include only those breakdates that introduce a change 
in the mean and/or the variance. These are then deemed to be the detected 
breakdates of the Nominating-Awarding procedure. 
Finally, equality of the means is tested by the standard t-test and the 
equality of the variances by the standard F-test, the Siegel-Tukey test with 
continuity correction (Siegel and Tukey, 1960; Sheskin, 1997), the adjusted 
Bartlett test (seeSokal and Rohlf, 1995; Judge et al., 1985), the Levene test 
(1960) and the Brown-Forsythe test (Brown and Forsythe, 1974).16 It is impor-
tant that we test the homogeneity of variances with more than one method 
because of the variations in the properties of each test. For example, on the 
one hand, the standard F-test, although quite powerful, requires sample sizes 
to be equal and is also sensitive to departures from normality. The Siegel-
Tukey test, on the other hand, although less sensitive to such departures does 
not require the equality of sample sizes, assumes independence in the sam-
ples, and equal medians. The original Bartlett test is also robust when the 
sample sizes are not equal, however it is sensitive to departures from normal-
ity and for that reason we employ its adjusted version which uses a correction 
factor for the critical values and the arc-sine square-root transformation of the 
data, in order to conform with the normality assumption. The Levene test, an 
alternative to the Bartlett test, is less sensitive to departures from normality 
while the Brown-Forsythe test(1974), a variant of the Levene test, uses the 
median instead of the mean to improve the performance (i.e. size and power) 
of the test when the underlying distributions are skewed. Using such a bat-
tery of tests requires us to employ a decision rule in order be able to draw 
coherent conclusions, especially when these tests produce conflicting results. 
The decision rule used in this paper is that if any two of these tests reject the 
null (i.e. the means and/or variances are not equal) then the segments are not 
united — in other words, the starting date of the second segment is identified 
as a breakdate. 
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4. D A T A A N D EMPIRICAL R E S U L T S 
The dataset used in this paper comprises monthly data for MoneyBase, MO, 
and Reserve Money of 13 member states of the Franc zone extracted from the 
International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (IFS) data-
base and spanning the periodl989:11—2002:09.17 We note that the MO data 
for each country is the value of notes and coins withdrawn from bank branch-
es in that country, net of the value deposited. Money withdrawn from country 
i can be spent in country j making the tracking of the conventional MO (vol-
ume of notes and coins in circulation) difficult. There have been some 
attempts by the central banks to track the movement of cash across national 
borders, primarily due to large cross-border movements (particularly, migra-
tion and remittances), however these have been largely unsuccessful and any-
policy deductions made in this paper should take this into consideration.18 
The west-African member states included are Benin (Ben), Burkina-Faso 
(BFaso), Cote d'lvoire (Civ), Mali (Mai), Niger (Net), Senegal (Sen) and Togo 
(Tog), jointly referred to as UEMOA; while the central-African member states 
are Cameroon (Cam), Central African Republic (CAR), Chad (Chd), Congo 
Republic (Con), Equatorial Guinea (GEQ), and Gabon (Gab), often jointly 
referred to as C E M A C . 1 9 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) stationarity tests on Alog(MO), 
Alog(Reserve Money) and Alog(Money Base) across member states. 
Ben 
BFaso 
Cam 
CAR 
Cgo 
Civ 
G a b 
G E Q 
M a i 
Ner 
Sen 
T e d 
T o g 
Alog MO 
-7.01(1) 
9.99(0) 
-13.37(0) 
-10.61(0) 
-16.23(0) 
- 7.47(2) 
-19.26(0) 
-11.92(2) 
-14.72(0) 
-18.79(0) 
-11.39(0) 
-10.46(0) 
-7.43(1) 
Alog(Reserve Money) 
-11.04(1) 
13.68(0) 
-14.43(0) 
-14.96(0) 
-14.42(0) 
-11.38(1) 
-15.92(0) 
-13.63(0) 
-15.22(0) 
-17.03(0) 
-15.49(0) 
-14.61(0) 
-11.40(1) 
Alog(Money Base) 
-14.78(0) 
12.11(0) 
-14.92(0) 
- 9.74(0) 
-13.36(0) 
- 9.49(0) 
-17.12(0) 
-11.70(0) 
-13.40(0) 
-18.48(0) 
-11.70(0) 
-10.78(0) 
-17.21(0) 
Notes: The nul l hypothesis of a unit-root is rejected in all cases at the 1% level. 
Numbers in parentheses represent selectedlag order based on the Schwartz 
Information Criterion (SIC) with a maximum lag length of 3. 
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Table 2: Correlation of Money Base Series Across Member States 
GEQ 
BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
Ben 
0.15 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.26 
0.24 
0.03 
0.17 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.07 
0.05 
0.09 
BFaso 
0.16 
0.10 
0.03 
0.27 
-0.04 
0.04 
0.09 
0.19 
0.14 
0.01 
0.16 
Civ 
0.04 
0.04 
0.26 
0.13 
0.06 
0.13 
0.04 
0.37 
0.16 
0.19 
Mai 
0.10 
0.07 
0.21 
0.06 
0.05 
0.13 
0.12 
0.00 
-0.02 
Ner 
0.07 
0.11 
-0.06 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.03 
Sen 
0.11 
0.17 
0.07 
0.17 
0.24 
-0.03 
0.24 
Tog 
0.11 
0.01 
0.08 
0.14 
0.14 
0.06 
Cam 
-0.06 
-0.01 
0.19 
0.12 
0.12 
CAR 
0.08 
0.07 
0.09 
0.23 
Ted 
-0.01 
0.07 
0.13 
Cgo 
0.08 
0.24 0.13 
Note: Entries in the top right half of the matrix have been ignored since they are a mir-
ror image of the bottom left section. 
Table 3: Correlation of MO Series Across Member States 
BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
Ben 
0.04 
0.05 
-0.09 
-0.24 
0.26 
-0.01 
0.29 
0.08 
-0.17 
0.14 
0.07 
0.14 
BFaso 
0.18 
0.04 
0.04 
0.36 
-0.12 
0.19 
0.08 
0.05 
0.16 
0.06 
0.09 
Civ 
0.19 
0.09 
0.57 
0.11 
0.41 
0.21 
0.03 
0.35 
0.21 
0.27 
Mai 
0.00 
0.12 
0.13 
0.09 
0.12 
0.16 
0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
Ner 
-0.08 
0.06 
-0.01 
0.04 
-0.04 
0.09 
-0.05 
-0.01 
Sen 
0.12 
0.36 
0.16 
0.12 
0.39 
0.09 
0.30 
Tog 
0.11 
0.07 
0.18 
0.21 
0.09 
0.15 
Cam 
-0.11 
-0.05 
0.50 
0.06 
0.20 
CAR 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.19 
Ted 
0.01 
0.06 
0.06 
Cgo 
0.10 
0.41 
EQ 
0.16 
Note: Entries in the top right half of the matrix have been ignored since they are a mir-
ror image of the bottom left section. 
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BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
Ben 
0.19 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.05 
0.19 
-0.09 
0.04 
0.05 
-0.13 
0.00 
-0.12 
-0.04 
Table 4: 
BFaso 
0.12 
0.15 
0.29 
0.17 
0.08 
0.06 
0.03 
0.03 
0.08 
-0.09 
0.03 
Correlation of Reserve Money Across Member States 
Civ 
-0.18 
0.18 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.05 
0.17 
-0.14 
0.15 
-0.01 
0.10 
Mai 
0.02 
0.22 
0.01 
-0.10 
0.01 
0.08 
-0.02 
0.07 
0.08 
Ner 
0.26 
-0.08 
0.00 
-0.07 
-0.10 
-0.04 
0.12 
0.01 
Sen 
-0.06 
0.00 
-0.05 
0.06 
-0.08 
-0.03 
0.10 
Tog 
0.05 
0.07 
0.03 
0.08 
0.02 
-0.11 
Cam 
0.24 
-0.08 
-0.01 
0.10 
0.17 
CAR Ted 
0.00 
0.06 -0.11 
0.04 -0.11 
0.19 -0.04 
Cgo 
-0.03 
-0.04 
GEQ 
0.01 
Note: Entries in the top right half of the matrix have been ignored since they are a mir-
ror image of the bottom left section. 
Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics of the log-differences of the 
data. Note also that the data to be analysed in this paper are in log-differences. 
In addition, Tables 2 - 4 show the cross-country correlations between the 
monetary variables, all of which the Central Bank monetary authorities may 
target with monetary policy. The monetary variables appear to be uncorrect-
ed, even for countries within each of the sub-unions (UEMOA and CEMAC). 
This preliminary observation is important and may be interpreted as signalling 
sub-optimality of a single zonal policy; especially when there is limited scope 
for policy formulation at the country level. Monetary variability across mem-
ber states may therefore vary significantly — this issue is tested empirically 
later in the paper. 
Breakdates in the monetary variables 
Our findings suggest that there are no significant breaks in the means of the 
series in either the pre- or post-devaluation periods (see Table 5). In fact, for 
all the series and across all the member states, the null of equal means is 
rejected only for the two periods in the Money Base series of Cam and only at 
the 10 per cent significance level. The overwhelming support for equal means 
in the money variables over the pre- and post-devaluation periods may be 
attributed to the administrative structures of the Zone, which are designed (at 
least, in principle) to 'harmonise' the effects of monetary policy of member 
states.20 
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Table 5: Tests for Significantly Different Means in the Pre- and Post Devaluation Period 
Alog(Money Base) Alog(MO) Alog(Reserve Money) 
Ben 
BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
pre-
0.0168 
0.0083 
0.0032 
0.0071 
-0.0002 
-0.0037 
-0.0106 
-0.0092 
0.0053 
-0.0037 
0.0060 
-0.0138 
0.0028 
post-
0.0087 
0.0002 
0.0090 
0.0111 
-0.0007 
0.0053 
0.0071 
0.0127 
-0.0012 
0.0115 
0.0090 
0.0244 
0.0021 
t-test 
0.49 
1.09 
0.49 
0.28 
0.02 
0.70 
1.30 
1.86*** 
1.17 
1.26 
0.22 
0.92 
0.04 
pre-
-0.0005 
0.0078 
0.0039 
0.0058 
0.0039 
0.0051 
-0.0152 
-0.0060 
0.0053 
0.0012 
0.0032 
-0.0175 
0.0016 
post-
0.0099 
-0.0028 
0.0067 
0.0094 
-0.0025 
0.0025 
0.0076 
0.0069 
-0.005 
0.0120 
0.0076 
0.0180 
0.0058 
t-test 
0.45 
1.47 
0.25 
0.23 
0.31 
0.19 
1.14 
1.13 
1.03 
0.86 
0.37 
0.51 
0.37 
pre-
0.0345 
0.0092 
-0.0051 
0.0083 
-0.0064 
-0.0193 
-0.0092 
-0.0223 
0.0044 
-0.0348 
0.0267 
-0.0090 
0.0099 
post-
0.0048 
0.0069 
0.0168 
0.0154 
0.0051 
0.0113 
0.0058 
0.0214 
-0.0150 
0.0094 
0.0131 
0.0389 
-0.0064 
t-test 
0.83 
0.09 
0.38 
0.21 
0.30 
0.73 
0.44 
1.51 
0.24 
0.96 
0.35 
0.83 
0.35 
Notes: In this table, *** indicates rejection of the nul l of no significant difference in 
the means of thetwo periods at the 10% level of significance. 
Tables 6 - 8 report the number and timing of the detected breaks in the vari-
ance of the Money Base, M0 and Reserve Money respectively (after the 
Nominating breakdates stage) while Tables 16- 21 report the corresponding 
results after the Awarding breakdates stage. Finally, Tables 9 - 1 5 report the 
alternative measures of volatility used in this paper to identify the variances 
in the pre- and post-official devaluation periods, and also in each of the iden-
tified regimes. Although we find no evidence of significant breaks in the 
mean of the series, the results in Tables 6 - 8 underscore the importance of 
investigating breaks in both the mean and the variance of series used in 
empirical applications. 
Overall, the results confirm that neighbouring (nominated) segments, 
as reported in the Columns 2 - 7 of Tables 6 - 8 , have statistically significant-
ly different variances, typically at the 5 per cent level. Except for four coun-
tries, (CAR, Civ, Cgo and Ted), the variances in the pre- and post- official cur-
rency devaluation periods are statistically different at the 5 per cent level for 
both the Money Base and M0 series. For Gab, there appears to be no statisti-
cal difference in the variances in the pre- and post-currency devaluation peri-
ods for the Money Base alone. A similar scenario is observed for both Sen and 
Tog when we consider M0 alone. With respect to Reserve Money, excepting 
CAR, Civ, Cam and Gab, the variances in the pre- and post-devaluation peri-
ods are all found to be statistically different. Therefore, from a broader point 
of view, out of the 13 member states, after imposing the breakdate and split-
ting the data into the pre- and post-official currency devaluation periods (with 
50 and 91 observations respectively), we detect a statistically significant break 
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(at the 5% level) in the variance for 8 member states for the Money Base series 
(Table 6); 7 for the MO series (Table 7); and 9 for the Reserve Money series 
(Table 8). When we do not impose the breakdate but instead we detect the 
changes non-parametrically (Columns 2-7) , the evolution of volatility appears 
completely different. 
Table 6: Detected Structural Changes in Alog(Money Base). 
Regimes 1 
Ben 
BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
0.050(56) 
0.0484(56) 
0.043(54) 
0.065(99) 
0.039(49) 
0.069(91) 
0.043(77) 
0.052(48) 
0.058(119) 
0.388(38) 
2 
0.117(96) 
0.0774(43) 
0.079(44) 
0.082(44) 
0.101(22) 
0.061(61) 
0.028(75) 
0.118(24) 
0.146(15) 
0.117(66) 
3 
0.1213(39) 
0.160(48) 
0.079(77) 
0.067(47) 
0.061(18) 
0.173(48) 
4 5 
0.029(18) 
6 pre-
0.044 
0.035 
0.063 
0.048 
0.039 
0.061 
0.039 
0.042 
0.035 
0.062 
0.067 
0.349 
0.087 
post-
0.113 
0.047 
0.070 
0.092 
0.131 
0.078 
0.092 
0.077 
0.030 
0.072 
0.080 
0.140 
0.082 
Notes: Along a given row, a bold font indicates a detected structural change relative to 
the preceding segment. A '.' indicates no break detection using the algorithm. 
Regimes 1 
Ben 
BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
0.082(49) 
0.034(99) 
0.026(29) 
, 
0.044(58) 
0.046(47) 
0.660(46) 
0.080(74) 
Notes: Along a 
the preceding 
Table 7: Detected Structural Changes in Alog(MO). 
2 
0.153(52) 
0.040(49) 
0.053(17) 
0.076(92) 
0.129(23) 
0.184(12) 
0.050(77) 
given row, a 
segment. A '. 
3 
0.306(14) 
0.091(45) 
0.066(48) 
0.139(54) 
4 5 
0.116(13) 0.055(20) 
0.177(42) 
0.024(18) 
bold font indicates a detected structura 
' indicates no break detection using the 
6 
c l 
pre-
0.088 
0.031 
0.061 
0.072 
0.050 
0.078 
0.125 
0.043 
0.034 
0.064 
0.070 
0.636 
0.078 
post-
0.151 
0.046 
0.066 
0.096 
0.142 
0.071 
0.092 
0.075 
0.032 
0.074 
0.067 
0.136 
0.056 
lange relative to 
algorithm. 
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Table 8: Detected Structural Changes in Alog(Reserve Money). 
<egim.es j 
Ben 
BFaso 
Civ 
Mai 
Ner 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
CAR 
Ted 
Cgo 
GEQ 
Gab 
0.069 (21) 
0.089(58) 
0.030(78) 
0.070(54) 
0.065(40) 
0.129(54) 
0.044(40) 
0.173((54) 
0.416(99) 
0.343(54) 
0.256(33) 
0.466(32) 
0.305(66) 
2 
0.055(35) 
0.190(84) 
0.575(21) 
0.242(94) 
0.138(13) 
0.175(20) 
0.060(17) 
0.165(98) 
0.557(53) 
0.228(98) 
0.208(119) 
0.291(117) 
0.240(86) 
3 
0.257(94) 
0.245(42) 
0.235(18) 
0.400(17) 
0.241(41) 
4 
0.337(36) 
0.262(61) 
0.242(54) 
0.206(13) 0.182(22) 
pre-
0.064 
0.088 
0.291 
0.067 
0.076 
0.127 
0.051 
0.168 
0.391 
0.312 
0.251 
0.389 
0.289 
post-
0.250 
0.167 
0.342 
0.231 
0.262 
0.280 
0/240 
0.163 
0.490 
0.230 
0.203 
0.294 
0.255 
Note: Along a given row, a bold font indicates a detected structural change relative to 
the preceding segment. A '.' indicates no break detection using the algorithm. 
Overall, the results confirm that neighbouring (nominated) segments, as 
reported in Columns 2 - 7 of Tables 6 - 8 , have statistically significant differ-
ent variances, typically at the 5 per cent level. Except for four countries, (CAR, 
Civ, Cgo and Ted), the variances in the pre- and post- official currency deval-
uation periods are statistically different at the 5 per cent level for both the 
Money Base and MO series. For Gab, there appears to be no statistical differ-
ence in the variances in the pre- and post-currency devaluation periods for the 
Money Base alone. A similar scenario is observed for both Sen and Tog when 
we consider M0 alone. With respect to Reserve Money, excepting CAR, Civ, 
Cam and Gab, the variances in the pre- and post-devaluation periods are all 
found to be statistically different. Therefore, from a broader point of view, out 
of the 13 member states, after imposing the breakdate and splitting the data 
into the pre- and post-official currency devaluation periods (with 50 and 91 
observations respectively), we detect a statistically significant break (at the 5 
per cent level) in the variance for 8 member states for the Money Base series 
(Table 6); 7 for the M0 series (Table 7); and 9 for the Reserve Money series 
(Table 8). When we do not impose the breakdate but instead we detect the 
changes non-parametrically (Columns 2-7) , the evolution of volatility appears 
completely different. 
In particular, our results confirm the following: 
(i ). In the case of the Money Base, there are significant breaks for BFaso, 
Civ, Sen, Cam and Gab; one break for Ben and CAR; two breaks for Mai, Ner, 
Tog, Cgo, and GEQ and three breaks for Ted. 
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(ii). In the case of MO, there are no breaks for BFaso, Civ, Sen, Mai, Ner, Tog, 
and Cgo; one break for Cam, Gab and GEQ, Ben and CAR; three breaks for 
Ner and Ted; and four breaks only in Ben. 
(iii). Finally, for Reserve Money, there are no breaks for Cam; there is one 
break for Ben, BFaso, Mai, Tog, CAR, Ted, Cgo, GEQ and Gab; two for Civ; 
and three for Ner and Sen. 
The evolution of monetary variability 
Money Base 
Ben 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Bfaso 
Pre-
Post-
Civ 
Pre-
Post-
M a l 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Pre-
Post-
Ner 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Pre-
Post-
Sen 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Tog 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Pre-
Post-
Table 9: Volatility Measures for Alog(Money Base). 
Obs. 
152 
56 
96 
50 
91 
152 
50 
91 
152 
50 
91 
152 
56 
43 
39 
50 
91 
152 
54 
44 
48 
50 
91 
152 
99 
44 
50 
91 
152 
49 
22 
77 
50 
91 
Mean 
0.0108 
0.0099 
0.0113 
0.0168 
0.0087 
0.0026 
0.0084 
0.0002 
0.0091 
0.0031 
0.0090 
0.0075 
0.0103 
-0.0012 
0.0057 
0.0070 
0.0110 
-0.0024 
0.0003 
-0.0121 
0.0035 
-0.0003 
-0.0006 
0.0045 
0.0003 
0.0095 
-0.0036 
0.0053 
0.0010 
-0.0104 
0.0027 
0.0027 
-0.0107 
0.0071 
Std. dev. 
0.0990 
0.0475 
0.1192 
0.0430 
0.1128 
0.0458 
0.0348 
0.0462 
0.0697 
0.0620 
0.0701 
0.0810 
0.0479 
0.0765 
0.1198 
0.0476 
0.0915 
0.1053 
0.0422 
0.0782 
0.1583 
0.0387 
0.1305 
0.0721 
0.0654 
0.0812 
0.0606 
0.0775 
0.0798 
0.0388 
0.0989 
0.0722 
0.0385 
0.0917 
VARHAC 
0.0824 
0.0462 
0.1147 
0.0418 
0.1126 
0.0466 
0.0358 
0.0453 
0.0581 
0.0868 
0.0526 
0.0450 
0.0338 
0.0558 
0.0575 
0.0309 
0.0622 
0.0705 
0.0421 
0.0403 
0.0990 
0.0383 
0.0844 
0.0465 
0.0651 
0.0845 
0.0593 
0.0790 
0.0574 
0.0610 
0.0477 
0.0566 
0.0627 
0.0639 
Skewness 
-0.09 
-0.42 
-0.07 
-0.32 
0.04 
0.70 
-0.53 
-0.15 
1.04 
1.17 
1.05 
0.28 
0.93 
-0.65 
0.52 
1.17 
0.42 
0.71 
0.41 
0.43 
0.55 
-0.13 
0.59 
0.60 
1.06 
-0.07 
1.06 
0.50 
0.89 
0.08 
0.71 
0.04 
0.09 
0.61 
Kurtosis 
5.56 
2.81 
4.15 
2.77 
4.47 
4.74 
3.75 
2.88 
3.82 
3.96 
4.15 
12.11 
8.95 
3.89 
8.70 
10.36 
11.19 
8.24 
3.22 
2.71 
4.70 
2.14 
5.75 
3.73 
4.65 
3.02 
4.91 
3.57 
6.19 
2.44 
3.01 
3.49 
2.48 
4.97 
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Reserve money 
Ben 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Pre-
Post-
Bfaso 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Civ 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Pre-
Post-
M a l 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Table 13: Volatility Measures for Alog(Reserve Money) 
Obs. 
152 
21 
35 
94 
50 
91 
152 
58 
84 
50 
91 
152 
78 
21 
42 
50 
91 
152 
54 
94 
50 
91 
Mean 
0.0085 
0.0641 
0.0049 
0.0008 
0.0345 
0.0048 
0.0033 
0.0091 
-0.0070 
0.0092 
0.0070 
0.0161 
0.0039 
0.0238 
0.0211 
-0.0050 
0.0169 
0.0047 
0.0072 
0.0025 
0.0083 
0.0153 
Std. dev. 
0.2064 
0.0672 
0.0542 
0.2558 
0.0628 
0.2489 
0.1560 
0.0882 
0.1889 
0.0875 
0.1660 
0.3296 
0.3029 
0.5612 
0.2419 
0.2877 
0.3406 
0.1951 
0.0688 
0.2403 
0.0661 
0.2302 
VARHAC 
0.1548 
0.0695 
0.0567 
0.1548 
0.0625 
0.1549 
0.1409 
0.0895 
0.1329 
0.0890 
0.1232 
0.1448 
0.1928 
0.5604 
0.2479 
0.0824 
0.1442 
0.1596 
0.0635 
0.1887 
0.0598 
0.1623 
Skewness 
-0.67 
-0.87 
-0.54 
-0.48 
-0.23 
-0.35 
-0.63 
0.45 
-0.57 
0.57 
0.08 
0.17 
0.28 
0.24 
-0.86 
0.05 
0.18 
0.81 
0.00 
0.72 
0.10 
0.94 
Note: Pre- and Post- indicate the periods before and after the devaluation date 
Reserve money 
Ner 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
Regime 5 
Regime 6 
Pre-
Post-
Sen 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
Pre-
Post-
Tog 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Regime 4 
Pre-
Post-
Table 14: Volatility Measures for Alog(Reserve Money) 
Obs. 
152 
40 
13 
18 
36 
13 
22 
50 
91 
152 
54 
20 
17 
61 
50 
91 
152 
40 
17 
41 
54 
50 
91 
Mean 
-0.0047 
0.0037 
-0.0328 
-0.0645 
0.0168 
-0.0290 
0.0386 
-0.0065 
0.0050 
0.0030 
-0.0091 
-0.0035 
-0.0425 
0.0286 
-0.0194 
0.0113 
-0.0058 
-0.0020 
-0.0475 
-0.0170 
0.0130 
-0.0092 
0.0058 
Std. dev. 
0.2167 
0.0644 
0.1322 
0.2288 
0.3320 
0.1982 
0.1783 
0.0749 
0.2611 
0.2325 
0.1279 
0.1703 
0.3879 
0.2596 
0.1258 
0.2788 
0.1922 
0.029 
0.0586 
0.2377 
0.2400 
0.0489 
0.2386 
VARHAC 
0.1579 
0.0606 
0.0581 
0.0549 
0.2245 
0.1922 
0.1256 
0.0735 
0.1789 
0.1049 
0.1240 
0.1665 
0.2179 
0.1178 
0.1212 
0.1036 
0.1302 
0.0430 
0.0616 
0.1796 
0.1552 
0.0311 
0.1487 
Skewness 
0.09 
-0.89 
0.97 
0.07 
-0.12 
0.73 
0.22 
-0.40 
0.08 
0.12 
-0.41 
0.40 
0.73 
-0.39 
-0.40 
0.06 
0.17 
-0.29 
0.93 
0.23 
-0.05 
0.02 
0.06 
Note: Pre- and Post- indicate the periods before and after the devaluation date 
Kurtosis 
4.23 
3.03 
2.54 
2.82 
2.37 
2.56 
6.54 
3.37 
5.16 
3.75 
2.91 
5.10 
3.03 
3.03 
5.73 
2.81 
6.04 
7.47 
2.80 
5.25 
2.96 
5.69 
respectively. 
...cont 
Kurtosis 
3.97 
3.41 
3.25 
2.16 
2.33 
3.41 
2.51 
2.63 
2.89 
5.44 
4.01 
1.82 
3.70 
3.71 
4.16 
4.25 
4.22 
2.53 
3.88 
2.46 
3.08 
2.62 
2.84 
respectively. 
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Reserve money 
C a m 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
C A R 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
T c d 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Cgo 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
G E Q 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Gab 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
Table 15: Volatility Measures for Alog(Reserve Money) 
Obs. 
152 
54 
98 
50 
91 
152 
99 
53 
50 
91 
152 
54 
98 
50 
91 
152 
33 
119 
50 
91 
152 
32 
117 
50 
91 
152 
66 
86 
50 
91 
Mean 
0.0117 
-0.0067 
0.0219 
-0.0224 
0.0215 
0.0130 
0.0107 
0.0172 
0.0043 
-0.0149 
0.0017 
-0.0072 
0.0066 
-0.0348 
0.0095 
0.0187 
0.0178 
0.0190 
0.0267 
0.0130 
0.0169 
-0.0084 
0.0284 
-0.0091 
0.0389 
0.0112 
0.0250 
0.0007 
0.0100 
-0.0064 
Note: Pre- and Post- indicate the period 
Std. dev. 
0.1688 
0.1757 
0.1639 
0.1659 
0.1618 
0.4667 
0.4142 
0.5514 
0.3866 
0.4873 
0.2725 
0.3401 
0.2266 
0.3086 
0.2293 
0.2175 
0.2522 
0.2069 
0.2486 
0.2021 
0.3314 
0.4584 
0.2898 
0.3847 
0.2921 
0.2684 
0.3026 
0,2383 
0.2858 
0.2540 
VARHAC 
0.1428 
0.1425 
0.1317 
0.1168 
0.1296 
0.3496 
0.4778 
0.1710 
0.3094 
0.2760 
0.2260 
0.3477 
0.1764 
0.3157 
0.1761 
0.1522 
0.1974 
0.1388 
0.2546 
0.2064 
0.1544 
0.4619 
0.2922 
0.3802 
0.2802 
0.2015 
0.3090 
0.1447 
0.1744 
0.1690 
Skewness 
0.22 
0.34 
0.17 
0.30 
0.06 
0.39 
0.44 
0.32 
0.58 
0.23 
0.05 
-0.02 
0.26 
-0.40 
0.30 
0.96 
0.38 
1.24 
0.42 
1.51 
0.19 
0.21 
0.21 
0.24 
0.28 
-0.35 
-0.37 
-0.39 
-0.38 
-0.41 
s before and after the devaluation date 
... cont 
Kurtosis 
3.04 
2.98 
3.13 
3.18 
3.12 
3.85 
5.01 
2.68 
4.87 
3.41 
3.47 
2.88 
3.16 
2.46 
3.09 
5.14 
2.62 
6.42 
2.61 
8,12 
5.18 
4.07 
4.54 
5.30 
4.90 
3.67 
3.36 
3.77 
3.82 
3.60 
respectively. 
Tables 9 - 1 5 report the main descriptive statistics and the two volatility meas-
ures used in this paper to identify the variances in the pre- and post- devalu-
ation periods, and also for each identified regime. 
In particular, we can deduce the following from the results in Tables 9 
- 10 (Money Base). On the one hand, when January 1994 is imposed as the 
breakdate, only the results for GEQ suggest a significant decrease in volatility 
in the period following the official currency devaluation date. In addition, for 
Civ, Ted, Cgo and Gab we find no statistical difference between the volatility 
between the two periods. On the other hand, when we do not impose a break 
date, the algorithm suggests that multiple regimes actually exist in most 
cases. 
- 34 -
Economic Issues, Vol. 15, Part 2, 2010 
With the exception of BFaso, Civ, Sen, Cam and Gab, where no signif-
icant difference in volatility of the series is found, at least two distinct regimes 
are found for each of the remaining member states. Of the eight remaining 
cases where significantly different breaks are determined, only Tog and Ted 
suggest an initial break within two months prior (November 1993) to the offi-
cial devaluation date. For Mai and Ner, the initial break occurs within six 
months (by July 1994) following the official devaluation date, while the initial 
break occurs later for the other member states. In most of the cases where a 
significant break is detected, it is suggestive of an increase in volatility of the 
series, however this is not conclusive as this is not the case for all member 
states. 
In Tables 11-12 (MO), imposing the break date suggests that approxi-
mately half of the member states (six out of thirteen) show a significant change 
in the volatility in MO between the two periods. However, not imposing a 
breakdate appears to be more informative, as the procedure indicates a rich-
er evolution of volatility in both the pre-and post-official devaluation periods, 
which is not captured otherwise. Preliminary tests suggest that as many as 
five regimes are detected in Ben, four in Ted and Ner, three in GEQ and two in 
BFaso, Cam and Gab. Robustness tests, however, show some regimes to be 
statistically similar (see Tables 7 and 18) at the one per cent level, such as in 
Civ, Mai, Sen, Tog, CAR and Cgo. 
Tables 14-15 suggest that imposing the January 1994 break date 
results in significantly different volatilities in the Reserve Money for all mem-
ber states in the two periods, except Civ, CAR, Cam and Gab. As with Tables 
9 - 1 2 , the identification of volatilities is richer when the (restriction of a) break 
date is not imposed. As many as six regimes are initially detected in Ner, four 
in Sen and Tog, three in Ben and Civ and two in each of the remaining mem-
ber states. Further tests for statistical difference, however, suggest that some 
consecutive regimes are not statistically different, at least at the five per cent 
level (see Tables 6-21). For example, the six regimes detected for Reserve 
Money in Ner is confirmed to be actually four distinct regimes. Furthermore, 
the volatility in the earlier detected regimes 5 and 6 (beginning in July 1999) 
is found to decrease to the level detected in regime 2 (ending in June 1993). 
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Table 16: 
Ben 
segl - seg2 
Bfaso 
Civ 
M a i 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
M a i 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
Sen 
segl-seg2 
Tog 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
Cam 
segl-seg2 
Wntpe* Tn ttii« 
Robustness Tests for separate segments 
F-test 
6.82** 
5.46** 
1.74** 
1.26 
3.66** 
2.56** 
6.31** 
2.46** 
11.26** 
3.45** 
14.11** 
4.09** 
1.62** 
1.56 
5.62** 
6.66** 
3.92** 
1.70 
3.33** 
1.30 
t a M p * ** 
Siegel-Tukey 
4.58** 
4.26** 
2.22** 
0.46 
3.97** 
3.46** 
3.05** 
0.09 
5.69** 
3.65** 
5.53** 
3.11** 
1.48 
1.00 
4.33** 
4.49** 
3.64** 
2.11** 
3.11** 
0.03 
Barlett 
43.97** 
39.65** 
4.55** 
0.85 
22.22** 
10.50** 
36.89** 
7.86** 
64.28** 
17.67** 
71.74** 
20.03** 
3.47* 
3.11* 
36.74** 
28.76** 
23.2** 
2.49 
19.39** 
1.23 
in Alog(Money Base) 
Levene 
19.39** 
21.04** 
5.17** 
0.65 
8.8** 
9.34** 
9.22** 
0.95 
27.3** 
17.63** 
34.17** 
10.64** 
3.44* 
2.43 
19.41** 
29.49** 
16.39** 
3.14* 
12.00** 
0.38 
m i l l n f n n eirxni 
series 
Browne-Forsythe 
i fir- c m 
19.35** 
21.04** 
5.9** 
0.49 
8.47** 
9.32** 
8.73** 
0.84 
27.38** 
14.27** 
33.76** 
10.7** 
2.81* 
2.59 
19.19** 
28.84** 
16.43** 
3.12* 
11.71** 
0.49 
1" rliffVir,fiT~ir'fi 
in the variances of the two segments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
Table 17: Robustness Tests for separate segments in Alog(Money Base) series ...cont 
F-test Siegel-Tukey Barlett Levene Browne-Forsythe 
0.60 
5.48** 
0.20 
16.3** 
1.10 
4.24** 
8.6** 
14.8** 
5.33** 
0.14 
17.55** 
0.00 
4.63** 
20.2** 
22.70** 
9.30** 
4.45** 
0.09 
Notes: In this table, *;**;*** indicates rejection of the nul l of no significant difference 
in the variances of the two segments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
C A R 
segl - seg2 
Ted 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg3-seg4 
Cgo 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
G E Q 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
Gab 
1.32 
2.42** 
1.36 
5.15** 
1.68* 
3.23** 
3.07** 
16.65** 
5.42** 
1.43 
6.23** 
1.07 
5.84** 
6.22** 
10.98** 
5.03** 
2.18** 
1.13 
0.10 
1.14 
0.07 
2.63** 
0.86 
1.89* 
2.13** 
3.16** 
3.06** 
0.48 
3.31** 
0.76 
1.75* 
4.42** 
4.67** 
3.00** 
1.82* 
0.28 
1.27 
14.09** 
1.71 
22.15** 
3.04* 
6.83** 
10.26** 
26.72** 
12.79** 
1.90 
31.87** 
0.03 
10.86** 
55.06** 
66.73** 
25.66** 
8.37** 
0.25 
0.63 
6.00** 
0.31 
16.57** 
1.26 
3.75* 
8.7** 
14.67** 
5.22** 
0.25 
17.91** 
0.02 
4.59** 
20.95** 
23.18** 
9.39** 
5.11** 
0.1 
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Ben 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
segl-seg5 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg2-seg5 
seg3-seg4 
seg3-seg5 
seg4-seg5 
BFaso 
segl-seg2 
Civ 
M a i 
Ner 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg3-seg4 
Table 18: Robustness Tests for separate segments in Alog(MO) 
F-test 
2.94** 
3.49** 
13.96** 
2.01 
2.18** 
4.00** 
1.74 
7.61** 
6.95** 
30.39** 
4.37** 
2.21** 
1.44 
1.18 
1.82** 
8.28** 
4.01** 
11.92** 
44.88** 
2.97** 
11.18** 
3.77** 
Notes: In this table, *,** 
in the variances of the two se 
Sen 
Tog 
Cam 
segl-seg2 
CAR 
Ted 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg3-seg4 
Cgo 
GEQ 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
Gab 
segl-seg2 
Siegel-Tukey 
1.96** 
2.76** 
4.51** 
1.18 
1.26 
3.52** 
0.35 
2.86** 
2.98** 
4.36** 
1.23 
1.39 
2.14** 
0.42 
0.98 
4.46** 
2.34** 
2.57** 
5.42** 
0.88 
3.57** 
3.11** 
1 Barlett 
15.87** 
17.81** 
45.31** 
2.58 
3.56* 
12.09** 
1.29 
19.36** 
9.65** 
36.35** 
7.91** 
8.98** 
2.16 
0.41 
5.26** 
51.60** 
10.07** 
37.12** 
70.56** 
5.61** 
21.31** 
17.48** 
Levene 
5.86** 
9.62** 
55.3** 
2.24 
2.62 
16.64** 
0.67 
8.97** 
12.3** 
34.78** 
6.50** 
5.01** 
1.93 
0.15 
0.04 
18.91** 
9.09** 
13.36** 
24.69** 
2.02 
9.23** 
10.6** 
series 
Browne-Forsythe 
5.87** 
8.77** 
51.99** 
1.99 
2.69 
15.82** 
0.63 
8.29** 
11.46** 
31.98** 
6.67** 
5.11** 
1.59 
0.19 
0.04 
18.82** 
7.68** 
11.13** 
24.70** 
1.65 
9.36** 
10.94** 
,*** indicates rejection of the nul l of no significant difference 
:gments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of sig 
Table 19: Robustness Tests for separate segments in Alog(MO) 
F-test 
1.20 
1.39 
3.02** 
2.95** 
1.12 
1.35 
7.71** 
1.99** 
3.83** 
3.88** 
29.50** 
7.61** 
1.07 
21.87** 
12.80** 
22.65** 
1.77 
1.93** 
2.56** 
Notes: In this table, *,** 
in the variances of the two se 
Siegel-Tukey 
1.43 
1.03 
2.14** 
2.30** 
0.46 
0.11 
3.70** 
0.21 
2.18** 
2.71** 
3.98** 
2.76** 
0.33 
5.78** 
2.27** 
5.07** 
1.74* 
1.52 
1.41 
Barlett 
0.52 
1.73 
16.67** 
18.05** 
0.22 
1.34 
32.96** 
5.32** 
8.62** 
14.84** 
35.29** 
17.34** 
0.07 
142.77** 
16.34** 
93.11** 
1.62 
7.17** 
15.9** 
Levene 
0.77 
1.24 
8.88** 
10.39** 
0.32 
0.20** 
24.23** 
1.16 
5.56** 
13.41** 
18.92** 
5.33** 
0.09 
51.96** 
5.87** 
34.12** 
2.25 
3.75** 
5.43** 
nificance respectively. 
series ...cont 
Browne-Forsythe 
0.76 
1.33 
8.82** 
9.99** 
0.32 
0.20 
23.56** 
1.20 
4.86** 
13.19** 
18.62** 
5.29** 
0.09 
50.29** 
5.85** 
34.03** 
2.25 
3.52* 
5.43** 
,*** indicates rejection of the nul l of no significant difference 
:gments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of sig nificance respectively. 
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Table 20: 
Ben 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
BFaso 
segl-seg2 
Civ 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
seg2-seg3 
M a i 
segl-seg2 
Ner 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
segl-seg5 
segl-seg6 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg2-seg5 
seg2-seg6 
seg3-seg4 
seg3-seg5 
seg3-seg6 
seg4-seg5 
seg4-seg6 
seg5-seg6 
Robustness Tests for separate segments in 
F-test 
15.56** 
1.57 
13.96** 
21.90** 
3.57** 
4.56** 
1.39 
3.56** 
1.55* 
5.52** 
12.02** 
12.11** 
12.06** 
4.45** 
13.01** 
26.61** 
10.00** 
7.82** 
2.93** 
5.98** 
2.25 
1.76 
2.05* 
1.30 
1.66 
2.66** 
3.40** 
1.28 
i« f a i l l e * ** 
Siegel-Tukey 
6.78** 
1.44 
4.42** 
6.53** 
4.21** 
4.04** 
0.76 
2.11** 
2.08** 
3.21** 
5.76** 
5.96** 
5.76** 
2.49** 
3.89** 
5.67** 
2.1** 
3.66** 
2.38** 
2.25** 
1.08 
0.12 
1.06 
1.14 
1.48 
1.91** 
2.24** 
0.26 
Barlett 
78.23** 
1.29 
31.89** 
66.75** 
21.47** 
32.71** 
1.64 
15.44** 
2.42 
20.86** 
67.03** 
72.51** 
67.16** 
12.03** 
41.47** 
74.59** 
29.47** 
29.44** 
3.53* 
9.93** 
1.84 
1.10 
2.60 
0.23 
1.20 
3.48* 
8.34** 
0.23 
Alog(Reserve Money) 
Levene 
55.69** 
1.26 
20.91** 
40.04** 
19.66** 
8.34* 
0.01 
11.81** 
3.68* 
15.62** 
26.88** 
29.61** 
38.53** 
8.74** 
45.37** 
46.8** 
18.82** 
22.17** 
5.4** 
8.57** 
1.27 
1.21 
2.11 
0.87 
2.08 
3.91* 
7.64** 
0.06 
m i l l n f n n eirxn 
series 
Broivne-Forsythe 
i f i r -cmt 
46.53** 
1.19 
17.78** 
34.13** 
19.64** 
18.46** 
0.01 
7.53** 
3.43* 
10.23** 
26.91** 
29.88** 
37.87** 
6.54** 
35039** 
46.41** 
16.87** 
20.82** 
4.43** 
8.75** 
1.26 
1.33 
2.19 
.69 
1.58 
3.94* 
7.48** 
0.04 
cont.... 
in the variances of the two segments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
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Table 21: 
Sen 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg3-seg4 
Tog 
segl-seg2 
segl-seg3 
segl-seg4 
seg2-seg3 
seg2-seg4 
seg3-seg4 
Cam 
segl-seg2 
CAR 
segl-seg2 
Ted 
segl-seg2 
Cgo 
segl-seg2 
GEQ 
segl-seg2 
Gab 
segl-seg2 
Robustness Tests for separate segments in 
F-test 
4.87** 
1.83 
9.60** 
4.11** 
5.24** 
2.25** 
2.33** 
23.58** 
1.93 
30.64** 
31.06** 
15.88** 
16.1** 
1.01 
1.06 
1.16 
1.57* 
1.79** 
1.83** 
2.27** 
1.53 
1.52 
1.75** 
2.56** 
1.28 
1.62** 
Notes: In this table, *,** 
in the variances of the two se 
Siegel-Tukey 
4.13** 
1.82* 
3.62.. 
3.35** 
1.94* 
0.68 
1.94* 
7.34** 
1.25 
6.37** 
6.25** 
5.18** 
3.36** 
0.23 
0.27 
0.08 
0.99 
1.66* 
2.18** 
2.74** 
3.67** 
2.71** 
1.32 
2.25** 
0.23 
1.45 
Barlett 
31.62** 
2.74-
38.61** 
25.19** 
10.91** 
3.99** 
5.13** 
96.83** 
2.59 
81.15** 
84.47** 
26.18** 
26.94** 
0.00 
0.06 
0.38 
3.08* 
5.96** 
5.99** 
12.09** 
2.91* 
2.35 
5.15** 
12.53** 
0.97 
4.28** 
Alog(Reserve Money) 
Levene 
17.06** 
4.09** 
23.18** 
1.58** 
5.67** 
1.61 
3.34* 
53.98** 
1.78 
58.73** 
41.96** 
21.51** 
15.26** 
0.09 
0.01 
0.11 
1.90 
5.74** 
6.92** 
11.36** 
7.24** 
4.50** 
2.27 
8.13** 
0.28 
3.34* 
series ...cont 
Browne-Forsythe 
17.11** 
3.53* 
18.08** 
14.62** 
4.28** 
1.76 
2.58 
52.05** 
1.37 
51.64** 
41.28** 
19.07** 
15.19** 
0.06 
0.01 
0.07 
1.83 
4.81** 
5.83** 
10.49** 
7.37** 
4.48** 
2.28 
8.02** 
0.28 
3.34** 
,*** indicates rejection of the nul l of no significant difference 
:gments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
Table 22: Detected Structural Change Dates in UEMOAand CEMAC 
IT 
C E M A C 
Alog(MO) 
Alog(Money Base) 
AlogfRes. Money) 1994:6** 
SAC, SAC: SAC: KLP. KU, LMT 
UEMOA 
Alog(MO) 
AlogfMoney Base) 1994:9*** 
AlogfRes. Money) 1994:9*** 1994:9*** 
1997:12** 
1994:9** 1994:9** 
igg4 :g*** 
Notes: Entries marked kkk kk-indicate detected breakdates at the 1% and 5% levels of significance 
respectively. 
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Table 23: Volatility Measures for Alog(MO), Alog(Money Base) 
and Alog(Reserve Money) in CEMAC and UEMOA areas. 
Alog(MO) 
C E M A C 
Pre-
Post-
U E M O A 
Pre-
Post-
Obs. 
152 
50 
91 
152 
50 
91 
Mean 
0.005 
-0.001 
0.008 
0.007 
0.002 
0.009 
Std. dev. 
0.036 
0.033 
0.037 
0.043 
0.042 
0.043 
VARHAC 
0.023 
0.021 
0.020 
0.026 
0.039 
0.033 
Skewness 
0.52 
0.68 
0.43 
1.14 
1.04 
1.18 
Kurtosis 
4.59 
4.09 
4.82 
4.21 
3.82 
4.35 
AlogfMoney Base) 
C E M A C 
Pre-
Post-
U E M O A 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
152 
50 
91 
182 
58 
94 
50 
91 
0.007 
-0.003 
0.012 
0.006 
0.004 
0.007 
0.002 
0.008 
0.038 
0.033 
0.039 
0.039 
0.025 
0.045 
0.025 
0.044 
0.042 
0.024 
0.030 
0.026 
0.039 
0.052 
0.035 
0.052 
0.37 
-0.09 
0.42 
1.34 
0.55 
1.27 
0.58 
1.24 
3.28 
3.18 
3.03 
5.86 
2.95 
4.90 
3.14 
4.97 
AlogfReserve Money) 
C E M A C 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Pre-
Post-
U E M O A 
Regime 1 
Regime 2 
Regime 3 
Pre-
Post-
152 
55 
97 
50 
91 
152 
58 
39 
55 
50 
91 
0.011 
0.011 
0.011 
-0.016 
0.024 
0.005 
0.002 
-0.017 
0.024 
0.002 
0.006 
0.126 
0.151 
0.110 
0.132 
0.120 
0.122 
0.045 
0.186 
0.118 
0.041 
0.145 
0.141 
0.152 
0.094 
0.097 
0.119 
0.102 
0.042 
0.127 
0.122 
0.037 
0.121 
0.22 
0.04 
0.45 
-0.16 
0.54 
-0.18 
0.08 
0.14 
-0.41 
0.19 
-0.19 
3.27 
2.78 
3.34 
2.83 
3.225 
6.14 
2.77 
3.53 
4.14 
3.02 
4.49 
Notes: Pre- and Post- indicate the periods before and after the devaluation date respectively. 
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Table 24: 
C E M A C 
Alog(MO) 
Pre-Post 
AlogfMoney Base) 
Pre-Post 
AlogfReserve Money) 
Pre-Post 
Segl-Seg2 
U E M O A 
Alog(MO) 
Pre-Post 
AlogfMoney Base) 
Pre-Post 
Segl-Seg2 
AlogfReserve Money) 
Pre-Post 
Segl-Seg2 
Seg2-Seg3 
Notes: Columns 2-5 
ference in means. *, 
Robustness Tests for separate segments in CEMAC and UEMOA 
F-test 
-
-
1.19 
-
1.43 
-
1.22 
1.91** 
-
-
1.05 
-
3.05*** 
3.08*** 
-
12.06* 
17.02*** 
2.48*** 
Siegel-
Tukey 
-
-
0.84 
-
0.80 
-
0.99 
2.21** 
-
-
0.193 
-
1.73* 
1.58 
-
5.04*** 
4.62*** 
2.32** 
Barlett. 
-
-
0.49 
-
2.00 
-
0.67 
7.57* 
-
-
0.047 
-
17.073*** 
19.47*** 
-
66.89*** 
81.62*** 
9.32*** 
Levene 
-
-
0.002 
-
1.608 
-
0.584 
7.031* 
-
-
0.153 
-
6.55** 
7.346*** 
-
24.25** 
32.24*** 
5.004** 
Browne-
Forsythe 
-
-
0.0004 
-
1.3992 
-
0.6359 
6.8628* 
-
-
0.880 
-
4.9067** 
5.0305** 
-
23.8856*** 
30.0182*** 
4.5357** 
re[resnt tests for difference in variance. Column 6 (t-test) is a 
t-test 
-1.527 
-2.300** 
-1.851*** 
0.030 
-0.8627 
-0.8633 
-0.5352 
-0.2168 
0.774 
-1.3351 
test fordif-
**,*** indicates rejection of the nul l of no significant differences in the 
variance (or mean) of the two indicated seg 
respectively. 
ments at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Monetary variability and monetary policy 
The main objective of monetary policy, price level stability, has not changed 
over the years. However, increasing internationalisation of financial markets 
implies that both real and nominal shocks to money stock have broadened the 
scope of issues that must be considered when pursuing policies geared 
towards domestic price stabilisation. In addition, it has widened (and compli-
cated, somewhat) the scope of policy transmission channels that may apply.20 
In the Franc zone, as in any other credible monetary union, financial 
integration diminishes the ability of policy makers, at the national level, to 
pursue domestic stabilisation policies independently. The central banks 
determine interest rates for the countries within their jurisdiction, thereby 
generating a limited scope for independent monetary policy by any individual 
country (see Figure 1). While there is some level of commonality in the breaks 
detected for each given series in member states, it is also readily evident that 
in some cases we detect breaks that are only particular to individual member 
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states. This result suggests that for some countries the centralised monetary 
policy may, indeed, be sub-optimal since the possibility of having a tailored 
response for individual member states is limited. 
Figure 1: BCEAO and BEAC Rediscount Rates, 1989:11-2002:09 
Policy recommendations from analyses that ignore structural changes 
can be perilous (Hansen, 2001). However, there is no shortage of empirical 
articles that analyse monetary variables under the assumption of a break date 
dictated by some exogenous policy implementation date. The application 
shown in this paper has highlighted the degree of information loss that a 
researcher can face by making such a simplifying assumption. For the Franc 
zone, the 1994 currency devaluation is arguably the most important monetary 
policy decision in its history, and it is of little surprise that almost all articles 
on the macroeconomics of the zone make mention of it, i n one form or anoth-
er. It is also true that it is not uncommon for an a priori assumption of a sin-
gle break date in the money stock of the zone to be made using the official cur-
rency devaluation date. Specifically, our results have shown that substantial 
information is lost by making such an assumption. In fact, when there is no 
provision for the possibility of multiple breaks, any conclusions drawn are 
likely to be severely biased. Although it may be argued that the imposition 
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of the breakdate averages out the structural breaks that are extracted using 
data-driven methods, the period being considered then becomes an important 
influencing factor. In short, the scope for erroneous conclusions about the 
degree of integration of the monetary series is increased by the implicit sup-
pression of some breakdates. 
The important implications of appropriate monetary policy, hence price 
stability, requires a correct assessment of the order of integration of the real 
money balances. A n inadequate assessment of the money variable will 
inevitably result in estimation errors, and hence inappropriate policies.21 The 
bias induced by the number of breakdates that go undetected through impos-
ing a single one a priori should be adequate justification for employing data-
driven methods of break detection. 
Monetary variability and aggregation 
A n important conclusion drawn from our results is the importance of the 
appropriate choice of target variable in monetary policy formulation. This is 
due to the heterogeneity in the number and timings of detected breakdates in 
the three monetary variables. 
In this paper, the Money Base is an aggregation of MO and Reserve 
Money. While significant breaks (in the variance) are detected in the Money 
Base series (Table 6), it is clear from the results reported in Tables 7 - 8 that 
when one considers only the aggregated series (i.e. Money Base) alone, there 
is significant loss of information, a result readily observable for each country 
in the sample. The results, presented in Tables 6 - 8 , therefore offer some sup-
port for Granger's (1980) aggregation hypothesis. Hence, in the determination 
of which variables to consider in empirical analysis, the choice of variables 
that are used in research for policy making should be of primary concern for 
its pragmatic implementation. Choice of a given variable may imply that some 
inherent information may not be captured, and may not therefore attract the 
attention of policymakers, even though it should. For example, the use of 
either MO or Reserve Money has uncovered more breakdates than the aggre-
gated Money Base variable, suggesting that the latter variable actually 'masks' 
the changes of the former ones. However, the specific purpose of the investi-
gation is paramount and should be given more weight in the decision-making 
process. In particular, when one assesses the aggregated data across the zone 
(i.e. U E M O A and CEMAC in Tables 22 - 24), the extent of 'missing' informa-
tion becomes even more obvious. A casual assessment of the literature shows 
that there is no shortage of studies that aggregate across the Franc zone, and 
which present policy suggestions based on their estimates. Our estimates 
reveal some significant loss of information, which is particularly important 
when one considers for example zone-wide policy impact on individual 
member states. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Application of methods that ignore structural changes can lead to inaccurate 
inferences being made about economic relationships, hence in misleading pol-
icy recommendations. Even when the existence of a certain break is consid-
ered an unambiguous fact, it is essential for the researcher to condition analy-
sis, modelling and policy recommendations on the potential existence of mul-
tiple breaks of unknown timing. This paper employs a method that could 
address such an issue, and has shows how misleading inferences can be when 
based on an imposed {known) single breakdate (in this case, an official cur-
rency devaluation date) and not on data-detected breakdates. Our findings 
also highlight the importance of scrutinising for the most appropriate mone-
tary variable for macroecomomic modelling since aggregate variables are like-
ly to mask the true dynamics of their components. 
Under the assumption that developing countries are more likely to suf-
fer from misleading policy recommendations regarding monetary variables, we 
have analysed three important potential monetary policy variables for thirteen 
Franc zone countries. We propose that break detection and timing methods, 
such as the one applied in this paper, are vital for correct model specification, 
improved analyses and policy formulation. Our results also offer some support 
for Granger's (1980) aggregation hypothesis, as we are able to extract more 
information on structural breaks from the disaggregated data compared to the 
aggregated data — irrespective of whether aggregation is done across the mon-
etary variables or across member states. In view of our findings further 
research is warranted, in that there is a need for a country by country analy-
sis in order to capture the overall effect of zonal monetary policy and draw 
robust conclusions about the soundness of such decisions. 
Accepted for publication: 7 May 2009 
APPENDIX 
A. The Franc zone 
The CFA Franc zone is the oldest monetary union currently in existence, pre-
dating the eurozone by many decades with the 14 member states' currencies 
pegged to the euro (formerly the French Franc). The CFA Franc zone is made 
up of two regions. The West-African group is referred to as the Union 
Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (hereafter UEMOA), and uses a com-
mon currency Franc de la Communuate Financiere de I'Afrique (CFAF) issued 
by their regional central bank (BCEAO). The Central-African group, often 
referred to as the Communaute Economique et Monetaire de I'Afrique Centrale 
(hereafter CEMAC), uses a common currency called the Franc de la 
Cooperation Financiere Africaine (CFAF) issued by their regional central bank 
(BEAC). (The acronyms BCEAO and BEAC refer to Banque Central des Etats 
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de VAfrique d'Ouest a n d Banque des Etats de VAfrique Central respectively.) 
Some features of the Zone set it apart from the rest of Africa's sub-region, par-
t icular ly the fixed parity w i t h the euro (formerly the F r e n c h Franc), the guar-
anteed convertibili ty of the C F A Franc by the F r e n c h Treasury, the pooled for-
eign exchange reserves a n d the l imits to credit to governments a imed at curb-
ing government over-spending. O f relevance to th is paper is the fact that the 
monetary a n d exchange rate policies are set by the two central banks , a n d not 
na t iona l authorit ies. Hence, pol icy decis ions s h o u l d reflect the fact that the 
collective welfare of the u n i o n supersedes the welfare concerns of a n ind iv id-
u a l member state. 
B. The currency devaluation of 1994 
Arguably , the most important pol icy issue i n the history of the Franc zone has 
been the one-time currency devaluat ion i n J a n u a r y of 1994. Especial ly over 
the mid-1980s th rough 1993, the economies of the Franc zone showed little 
economic growth (if any) a n d goods p roduced by these countr ies were largely 
pr iced out of the w o r l d market as the exchange rate for the C F A franc was arti-
ficially h igh . A s a means of rectifying the s i tuat ion, after consul t ing w i t h one 
another a n d w i t h bo th the I M F a n d France, the member states made the bo ld 
decis ion to devalue the C F A Franc (CFAF) by 50 pr cent. Indeed, o n the 12th 
of J a n u a r y 1994 it became official that a 100 C F A F exchanged for 1 F r e n c h 
Franc (FF), ins tead of the previous rate of 50 C F A F : 1 F F . However, there is no 
f inal verdict yet as to whether th is strategy has offered long-term gains to the 
economies of the member states. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Department of Economics, Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, NE1 4JF. Corresponding author: Simeon Coleman, Division of Economics, 
Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham NG1 4BU. 
Email: simeon.coleman@ntu.ac.uk We gratefully acknowledge valuable comments on 
earlier versions of this paper from colleagues, anonymous referees and editors of this 
journal for helpful comments. Al l remaining errors are ours. 
2. A n idea popularised in the famous Nobel lecture by Friedman (1977). 
3. Changes in the political environment, the Terms of Trade, perceptions of non-inde-
pendence in the judicial system and institutions, the security of investments, and the 
credibility of policy announcements may well lead to huge capital inflows/flight. 
4. See Caporale (1993) and references therein for a review of some studies on both 
sides of the debate. 
5. For economies with such characteristics, manipulating MO, which although not 
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under the direct control of Central Banks can be influenced through conventional pol-
icy instruments, remains a potentially effective monetary policy strategy. 
5. Nevertheless, it is relatively straightforward to condition the analysis on observables 
as well, although beyond the scope of this paper. 
7. Reserve Money being a result of policy on Reserve requirements. Al l three variables 
are, at least directly or indirectly, available to the Central Banks as policy instruments 
for each of the countries in our sample. 
8. Some early research articles include Dornbusch, 1973; Obstfield, 1986; Hossain, 
2005. 
9. For the interested reader, Appendices A and B provide a brief background to the CFA 
Franc zone and the 1994 currency devaluation. 
10. A potential limitation of the procedure is that it does not cater explicitly for possi-
ble cross country dependency in the variables. Moreover, our use of differenced data 
may ignore common trends in the data. However, given that we use monthly data in 
this paper these potential limitations are unlikely to introduce any significant bias, if 
at all. We thank an anonymous referee for a comment on this. 
11. With the large number of HAC estimators available to the researcher, this stage 
allows for some flexibility. 
12. Note that in order to comply with the relevant econometric literature, we have used 
the terms date and breakdate to refer to the month and break-month that correspond 
to our sample frequency. 
13. Sanso, Arago, and Carrion, (2003) derive some of the asymptotic properties of I&T, 
SAC1, and SAC2 for the various levels of kurtosis while Andreou and Ghysels (2002) 
provide some simulation evidence for I&T and K & L using a number of GARCH(1,1) 
DGPs. See also Karoglou (2006c). 
14. This algorithm has been found to be more robust to the existence of transitional 
periods, which are particularly relevant to the series of developing economies, when 
compared to the ICSS algorithm of Inclan and Tiao (1994), since it imposes the detec-
tion of breakdates to be ordered in time (and therefore it can avoid possible masking 
effects due to the presence of transitional periods). 
15. Naturally, an even more robust procedure would require testing the statistical 
equivalence of higher moments as well. However, the focus of this paper is the first two 
moments only and therefore this assumption is actually weak. 
16. Al l tests have been carried out using EViews. 
17. This period is particularly significant, as it includes the two main periods likely to 
introduce significant breaks in the series - the 1994 devaluation and the pegging of the 
CFAF to the euro in 2001. 
18. Although this measure makes the link between M0 and prices in country i less 
straightforward, the analyses and policy deductions made in this paper are still valid 
with this measure of M0. 
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19. See Appendix A for a brief description of the background of the monetary groups 
and their central banks, often referred to by the acronyms BCEAO and B E AC. 
20. A thorough review of the administrative and constitutional arrangements that 
underpin the entire Franc zone can be found in some previously published literature 
including Fielding (2002). 
21. The well documented events of the Asian crisis of 1998/9, and subsequent effects 
of contagion, underscore the potential deleterious consequences of inadequate adjust-
ment of monetary policy in such situations. 
22. Of course, the implications of this result is by no means restricted to the Franc 
zones. However, the limitations on country-level monetary policy formulation in the 
monetary union, and the typical imposition of the breakdate of January 1994 in empir-
ical work, make it particularly relevant. 
REFERENCES 
Andreou E and Ghysels E (2002) 'Detecting Multiple Breaks in Financial Market 
Volatility Dynamics', Journal of Applied Econometrics. 17, 579-600. 
Barro R J (1976) 'Rational Expectations and the Role of Monetary Policy', Journal of 
Monetary Economics. 2, 1-32. 
Brown M B and Forsythe A B (1974), 'Robust Tests for the Equality of Variances', 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69, 364-367. 
Caporale T (1993) 'Monetary Variability and Real Output', Economics Letters, 42, 219-
222. 
Devereux M (1987) The Effects of Monetary Variability on Welfare in a Simple 
Macroeconomic Model', Journal of Monetary Economics, 19, 427-435. 
Dornbusch R (1973) 'Devaluation, Money, and Nontraded Goods', American Economic 
Review, 63(5), 871-880. 
Fielding D (2002) The Macroeconomics of the Monetary Union, An Analysis of the CFA 
Franc Zone, London: Routledge. 
Fielding D (2004) 'How Does Monetary Policy Affect the Poor? Evidence From the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union', Journal of African Economies, 13(4), 563-593. 
Friedman M (1977) 'Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment', Journal of Political 
Economy, 85, 451-472. 
Granger C W J (1980), 'Long Memory Relationships and the Aggregation of Dynamic 
Models', Journal of Econometrics, 25, 227-238. 
Gray J A (1976) Wage Indexation: A Macroeconomic Approach', Journal of Montary 
Economics, 2, 221-235. 
den Haan W J and Levin A (1997), Vector Autoregressive Covariance Matrix 
Estimation'. Manuscript, University of California, San Diego. 
- 47-
S Coleman and M Karoglou 
Hansen B E (2001) The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in US 
Labor Productivity', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 117-128. 
Hossain A (2005) 'Granger-Causality Between Inflation, Money Growth, Currency 
Devaluation and Economic Growth in Indonesia, 1951-2002', International Journal of 
Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Euro-American Association of Economic 
Development, 2(3), 45-68. 
Inclan C and Tiao G C (1994) IJse of Cumulative Sums of Squares for Retrospective 
Detection of Changes of Variance' Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89, 
913-923. 
Judge G G, Griffiths W E , Hill R C, Lutkepohl H , and Lee, T C(1985) The Theory and 
Practice of Econometrics, 2e, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Karoglou M (2006a) 'Breaking down the non-normality of stock-returns', Mimeograph, 
University of Leicester, UK. 
Karoglou M (2006b) 'On the Detection of Structural Changes in Volatility Dynamics 
with Applications', PhD. Thesis, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK. 
Karoglou M (2006c) The Size and Power of the CUSUM-type Tests in Detecting 
Structural Changes in Financial Markets Volatility Dynamics'. Mimeograph, 
University of Leicester, UK. 
Kokoska P and Leipus R (2000) 'Change-point Estimation in A R C H Models', Bernoulli 
6. 
Lee S, Tokutsu Y and Maekawa K (2003) The Residual Cusum Test for the Constancy 
of Parameters in GARCH (1,1) Models'. Working papers at Hiroshima University. 
Levene H (1960) 'Robust Tests for Equality of Variances', in I Olkin et al (eds.) 
Contributions to Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Harold Hotelling.Palo Alto, 
Cal: Stanford U P, 278-292. 
Obstfeld M (1986) 'Capital Controls, the Dual Exchange Rate, and Devaluation', 
Journal of International Economics, 20, 1-20. 
Perron P (1990) Testing for a Unit Root in a Time Series with a Changing Mean', 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 8(2), 153-162. 
Sanso A, Arago V and Carrion J L (2003) Testing for Changes in the Unconditional 
Variance of Financial Time Series'. Department d'Economia Aplicada Working Paper, 
Universitat de les illes Balears, Spain. 
Sheskin D J (1997) Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures, 
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Siegel S and Tukey J W (1960) 'A Nonparametric Sum of Ranks Procedures for Relative 
Spread in Unpaired Samples', Journal of the American Statistical Association. 55, 429-
444. 
Sokal R R and Rohlf F J (1995) Biometry: The Principles and Practice of Statistics in 
Biological Research, 3e. New York: W. H . Freeman and Co. 
- 48 -
